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A credible electoral process, which leads to the 
peaceful transfer of power, plays a vital role in 
democracy. The success of an election depends 
to a large part on the independence, capacity and 
impartiality of the Election Management Body of a 
particular country (Elklit et al, 2001; Pastor, 1999). 
Under the Constitution of Bangladesh (Article 119), 
the Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC) is 
responsible for administering direct elections to the 
Parliament and at all levels of local government. The 
concerned subordinate legislations have entrusted 
the BEC with conducting indirect elections for the 
offi ce of the President and the reserved seats of 
the Parliament. Besides, the BEC is responsible 
for preparing electoral roll for all elections under 
its jurisdiction and delimiting constituencies for 
the parliamentary election. Reliable performance 
of these functions largely depends upon the 
institutional capacity of the BEC. But the profusion 
of electoral malpractices has unveiled the lack of 
institutional capacity of the BEC, even during the 
course of the so-called ‘democratic period’ since 
1991.  Most recently, events in the lead-up to the 
aborted election scheduled for January 2007 have 
questioned the impartiality and accountability of 
the BEC.  
The present Caretaker Government started 
reforming the BEC by reconstituting the 
Commission. The newly formed Commission 
undertook several signifi cant reforms in the legal 
framework through a consultative process and 
started preparing a photo-attached digitised 
voter list. The Government also responded to the 
long-standing demand for enhancing the BEC’s 
independence, by placing its secretariat under the 
control of the Commission itself - rather than the 
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Prime Minister’s Offi ce -  through promulgating the 
Election Commission Secretariat Ordinance 2008.   
In order to strengthen the BEC’s reform initiatives, 
the Institute of Governance Studies (IGS) has 
developed some broad-based policy options for 
increasing and sustaining the institutional capacity 
of the BEC.1  The recommended policy actions 
cover four thematic areas:
Issue 1: Independence: The BEC should be free 
from the undue infl uence of the executive branch 
of the government, political parties, and electoral 
candidates. 
Issue 2: Accountability: The BEC should 
be transparent in its activities and fi nancial 
management. The secretariat  should  be 
accountable to the Commission, which 
should remain accountable to the President 
and the Parliament. Judicial review should be 
explicitly available to citizens where the 
Commission is in violation of the law. 
Issue 3: Efﬁ ciency: The BEC should make 
optimum utilisation of available resources to carry 
out its mandated functions in holding free, fair and 
timely elections. 
Issue 4:  Effectiveness: The BEC should be 
effective in achieving its objectives and performing 
its mandated functions in accordance with the 
Constitution, laws and subordinate legislation.
1 IGS organised an international workshop on 23-24 
January 2008 to facilitate a deliberative process to formulate 
policy recommendations. This Policy Note is based on the 
workshop discussions, literature review and an empirical 
study conducted in the preparation for the workshop.
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1. INDEPENDENCE
 
1.1. Freedom from Government Interference
Article 126 of the Bangladesh Constitution and 
Article 5 of the Representation of the People Order 
1972 (RPO 1972) provide that it is the duty of the 
executive branch of government to assist the 
Commission in the discharge of its functions. The 
BEC depends on the Government for preparing 
the electoral roll, preserving law and order during 
elections and conducting the elections. But no 
redress is available if the government does not 
comply with the BEC’s directions or distorts them 
during implementation. 
Policy Recommendation: Promulgate an 
enabling law clearly stating the power of 
the BEC in relation to the government and 
a clear avenue for redress in the event that 
the Government fails to comply with or 
distorts the implementation of the BEC’s 
directives. 
The experience of other countries provides clear 
guidance in this respect. For instance, the Electoral 
Commission of Australia is entitled to take any action 
in the interest of free and fair elections and can lodge 
a petition with the Federal Court against any person 
or authority trying to manipulate elections. 
1.2. Appointment of the Chief Election 
Commissioner (CEC) and Other Election 
Commissioners (ECs) 
Despite having the constitutional provision (Article 
118(1) of the Bangladesh Constitution) for enacting 
a law governing appointments of the CEC and 
the ECs, no such law yet exists. As in the case 
of other decisions and appointments to senior 
constitutional positions, the President acts on the 
advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(3) of 
the Constitution. This arrangement provides the 
opportunity for politicising appointments of the 
CEC and the ECs. 
Policy Recommendation: Promulgate        an 
Act/Ordinance devising a consultative and 
transparent process for appointing the CEC 
and ECs and ensure proper parliamentary 
deliberation on such appointments.
 
The Act/Ordinance may have the provision to form 
a search committee appointed by the President 
or the Parliament to select competent persons to 
be appointed to constitutional bodies, including 
the BEC. To counteract government interference, 
the committee should include (i) MPs from ruling 
and opposition parties, and (ii) representatives 
from the civil society.  The search committee 
may offer a shortlist of qualified persons for the 
consideration of the Parliament, and this process 
should be public. To ensure greater transparency 
and legitimacy, the Act/Ordinance may provide 
for a Special Parliamentary Committee on 
Constitutional Bodies to be formed in accordance 
with the Rule 266 of the Rules of Procedure 
to review the qualifications of the nominated 
persons. The Parliament should approve the 
list of selected persons on recommendation of 
the Committee and send it to the President for 
appointment. 
Considering the importance of leadership in 
independent functioning of the Commission, the 
Act should specify qualifications and ineligibility 
criteria for such appointments.
Policy Recommendation: Specify 
qualifications and ineligibility criteria for 
appointments to the posts of CEC and ECs 
in the proposed Act/Ordinance.
 
As the posts of the commissioners are 
senior constitutional positions, it is important 
to emphasize  on extensive experience in 
administrative or judicial services (for instance a 
period of twenty years’ service). Persons outside 
of the government services who are renowned 
for their innovative management capacity, 
leadership, civic awareness and integrity may 
also be considered. Special achievements of 
the appointees, such as awards and fellowships, 
should be taken into consideration to gauge their 
leadership capacity. 
The following should be considered as 
disqualifying criteria:
•	 any	disciplinary	action	suffered	during	career
•	 record	of	criminal	offence
•	 political	 affiliation	 in	 the	 forms	 of	 	 formal	
membership of a party or any of its wings, 
known supporter or donor of that party 
•	 candidature	in	elections	at	any	level
•	 	a	member	of	a	trade	union	or	any	similar	body	or	
association, such as the student or professional 
wing of a political party 
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Policy Recommendation: Define and specify 
administrative expenses of the BEC and 
ensure proper parliamentary deliberation 
on capital and development expenditure 
proposals of the BEC through the formation 
of a Special Parliamentary Committee. 
The administrative expenses of the BEC should 
be considered in the same way as those of the 
judiciary. A Special Committee could be formed 
pursuant to Rule 266 of the Rules of Procedure 
to conduct deliberations on the budget proposals 
of all constitutional bodies, including the BEC. 
Development budgets of constitutional bodies 
should not be included in the Annual Development 
Plan (ADP) and can be shown separately in the 
annual financial statement. Once approved by 
the Parliament, the development (non-recurrent) 
activities of constitutional bodies should be 
exempted from approvals of the Executive 
Committee of the National Economic Council and 
Planning Commission. 
2. ACCouNtAbIlIty
2.1. Financial Accountability
Until recently, the MoF was responsible for ensuring 
pre-expenditure accountability by approving 
heads of expenditure and disbursement. It also 
ensured accountability of charged administrative 
expenses by circumscribing limits. The office 
of the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) 
was responsible for ensuring post-expenditure 
accountability. But the latter was largely ineffective 
and the Public Accounts Committee’s jurisdiction 
in overseeing the BEC’s financial matters was 
unclear. After promulgation of the BEC Secretariat 
Ordinance 2008, the BEC is not required to have the 
approval of the MoF for spending from its budget 
allocation (Article 7 of the BEC Secretariat Ordinance 
2008). Thus  pre-expenditure accountability of the 
BEC has been relaxed.  However, to balance this 
budgetary independence with accountability, the 
role of the C&AG and parliamentary committees 
should be strengthened.
Policy Recommendation: Strengthen the 
parliamentary accountability of the BEC 
in financial matters through the C&AG, 
PAC and establish a Special Parliamentary 
Committee for Constitutional Bodies.
•	 having	contract	bearing	personal	gain	with	the	
government or any political parties, and
•	 loan	default/utility	bill	default/tax	default,	which	
can be investigated through BB, utility service 
providers, and NBR respectively. 
1.3. Autonomy of the Commission’s Officials 
Until recently, the BEC secretariat and its field 
offices were under the control of the Prime 
Minister’s Office (Schedule IV, ROB, GOB). 
Therefore, the Government had ample opportunity 
to influence the BEC’s operations. The newly 
promulgated Election Commission Secretariat 
Ordinance 2008 places the Secretariat under the 
control of the Commission. However, the new 
Ordinance provides that deputed officials are not 
considered as officials of the BEC secretariat and 
thus the BEC’s service rules are not applicable to 
them. This provision may leave room for significant 
government influence. 
Policy Recommendation: Stop the practice 
of deputation in the long run and allow 
the BEC to have complete control over 
deputed officers in the short run. 
The recruitment rules that the BEC shall have 
to enact in pursuance of Article 9(1) of the BEC 
Secretariat Ordnance 2008 should limit the scope 
of deputation only to technical posts, and stop it to 
higher managerial posts.  In the short run, to gain 
full control over deputed officials, the Commission 
should enjoy the authority to select such officials 
for a fixed tenure. Moreover, during this tenure, 
the Commission should have the authority to 
manage their careers. This will require revision of 
the existing Rules of Business.
1.4. Financial Independence
As per Article 88 of the Constitution, salaries 
of the commissioners and BEC officials and 
its administrative expenses are charged on the 
consolidated fund. However, the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) has the authority to circumscribe 
the charged administrative expenses of the BEC 
in the name of financial discipline.  The capital 
and the development expenditures of the BEC 
are not charged on the consolidated fund and are 
thereby subject to the control of the MoF. There 
is currently no recourse for the BEC to justify its 
budget proposal to Parliament if the MoF denies 
its reasonable demands.
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The proposed special committee can scrutinise 
audit reports of the BEC. It can also monitor 
procurement and implementation of development 
(non-recurrent) activities.
2.2. Procedural Accountability
Accountability of election officials is very important 
for ensuring credible elections. At present, any 
investigation against an accused official for 
allegedly manipulating the election process is 
carried out by other BEC officials and government 
officials vested with electoral responsibilities 
(Deputy Commissioner, Upazilla Nirbahi Officer 
etc.) and done so in private, which casts suspicion 
about the impartiality of the process. Moreover, no 
court can entertain such cases without the approval 
of the Commission. Therefore, it is necessary to 
ensure transparency and independence of any 
investigation process.
Policy Recommendation: Ensure 
representation of the complainant in the 
investigation process and disseminate the 
outcome of such investigation through the 
Official Gazette. 
Implementing this recommendation will require a 
revision of the RPO 1972. Representation should 
be limited to producing evidence, monitoring 
progress of the investigation and lodging a no-
confidence motion with the Commission about 
the investigation process on specified grounds to 
avoid unnecessary complexities. 
2.3. Performance Accountability
2.3.1 At present there is no mechanism for holding 
the BEC accountable for its performance.  The 
Parliament might be the best formal instrument for 
holding the BEC accountable in this regard. 
Policy Recommendation: A legislative 
provision should be promulgated so that 
the BEC publishes an annual report on 
its yearly activities and present it to the 
Parliament through the President.
The report should be candid. It should contain 
information about the cases where the BEC sought 
assistance from the executive, but such assistance 
was not forthcoming or was problematic. The 
proposed Special Committee can scrutinise the 
report. An MP can raise a petition as per the Rule 
100 of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament 
against any irregularities of the BEC based on the 
report.
2.3.2 Political parties and citizens are the 
major clients of the BEC. Therefore, the BEC’s 
activities and performance should be transparent 
to them. The BEC has started consulting political 
parties only recently. But it has no formal channel 
of communication to inform the parties about 
its actions and to receive feedback from them 
on a regular basis. At present, the BEC has no 
accountability for service delivery to citizens other 
than through a prerogative writ viz. public litigation, 
which is expensive and lengthy.  
Policy Recommendation: Create a formal 
channel of communication between the 
BEC and political parties by revising the 
existing Political Party (Registration) Rules 
2001 and enact a citizen/service charter to 
ensure accountable service delivery.
The Commission may create a separate wing to 
establish regular communication with political 
parties. The citizen/service charter should be 
developed in line with the Right to Information 
Ordinance. 
3. EffICIENCy
3.1. Human Resource Management
3.1.1 Under the existing system, recruitment 
in the secretariat and field offices is carried out 
separately. This practice creates an artificial 
boundary between the secretariat and field offices 
and makes positions non-transferable. This is a 
major source of internal conflict and inefficiency. 
Policy Recommendation: Organise 
positions in the secretariat and field offices 
and determine equivalency among officers 
in qualification and job responsibility, and 
make them transferable.
Implementing this recommendation will require 
enacting the forthcoming service rules following 
position classification principles. The Commission 
may consider framing a transfer policy following 
job rotation principles within the field level posts to 
motivate its personnel.  
3.1.2 The Election Commission (Officers and 
Staff) Rules 1979 provide highly discriminatory 
promotion rules in favor of Secretariat officials. 
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For instance, persons who joined as Assistant 
Secretaries (AS) in 1984 were promoted to the 
posts of Joint secretaries in 2003. But those who 
joined as the District Election Officers in a field 
office (equivalent to the AS in the Secretariat) 
during the same year had not received a single 
promotion until 2004. This discrimination frustrates 
the officials working at field level. 
Policy Recommendation: Consider 
equitable and merit-based promotion in 
the forthcoming recruitment rules.    
Implementing this recommendation will require 
an effective performance-planning system for 
measuring merit. 
3.2. Human Resource Development
3.2.1 The BEC has no sound human resource 
development policy. The Electoral Training Institute 
provides training to entry-level employees on election 
management. Mid-level officials receive training 
only when some changes are made in the election 
administration. There are no needs-based training 
facilities for mid-level and higher-level officers 
on subjects like project management, financial 
management, public policy, office management, 
strategic planning, organisation design and 
development.  Therefore, BEC staff suffers from 
severe lack of expertise and career planning.
Policy Recommendation: Develop training 
facilities for officials at all levels. 
This can be done by partnering with Bangladesh 
Public Administration Training Centre as well as 
professional training institutes in the private sector. 
At the same time, the BEC should take measures 
to create opportunities for overseas training in 
collaboration with development partners. Besides, 
efforts should be taken to link training with career 
planning. 
3.2.2 Disclosure of eight kinds of information 
about a candidate (such as asset and liabilities, 
bank loans, utility bills payment, education 
and criminal record) with the nomination paper 
has been made mandatory by the High Court 
(Abdul Momen Chowdhury and others vs. the 
Government of Bangladesh, delivered on 24 
May 2005). The BEC has not yet developed 
techniques to examine authenticity and accuracy 
of submitted information. 
Policy Recommendation: Make 
information about candidates public and 
consider building partnership with relevant 
organisations to examine accuracy of 
given information.  
The BEC can ask for the latest tax return of each 
candidate instead of asking information on assets 
and liabilities. It may take help from the NBR and the 
ACC to examine disclosed information. Similarly, 
it can ask for submitting no-objection certificates 
from relevant utility services, Bangladesh Bank, 
Office of Police Super, etc. It can reexamine 
submitted documents in collaboration with the 
concerned agency, which issued no-objection 
certificates.
4. EffECtIvENEss
4.1. Organisational Structure 
4.1.1 The existing organisational structure of the 
BEC is inadequate to carry out its responsibilities. 
As the structure has been designed like a typical 
government agency, it hinders the BEC in 
communicating with different stakeholders.  It also 
thwarts the much needed internal co-ordination 
necessary for its financial management, strategic 
planning and research activities. 
Policy Recommendation: The BEC, the 
MoE, and the MoF together should revise 
the existing organisational structure.  
The role of the MoE and the MoF should be advisory 
and not be authoritative. In the revised structure, 
positions should be rearranged in a way that will 
accommodate required new skills (i.e automation/
digitalisation, outreach and stakeholder management 
etc.)  without an increase in total manpower. 
Increasing in-house financial management capacity 
should be a major concern in the revised structure. 
Emphasis should be given on reducing the strength 
of class III and IV level employees, which currently 
constitute 72% of the staff.
4.1.2 At field level, the organisational structure 
is quite diffused and disorganised. The upazilla 
offices have only three officials. District offices 
have seven officials, of whom only two belong to 
class I. In fact, the BEC does not require offices 
at each upazilla, as it is not engaged in day-to-
day administration of public affairs. Moreover, the 
Bangladesh Election Commission Policy Note06
develop activity-based performance indicators 
for each objective to review performances 
objectively.
 4.3. Electoral Enrolment
A credible electoral roll is a precondition for a 
free and fair election. The BEC has prepared 
a photo-attached digitised roll in collaboration 
with the Bangladesh Army to increase the 
authenticity of the roll. The Electoral Roll 
Ordinance 2007 provided for yearly updating of 
the roll, which may become a challenge for the 
BEC. Purposive updating may be considered 
as well. For example, Electoral Commission of 
Australia undertakes an ‘election drive’ before 
an election (federal/state/local). 
Policy Recommendation: Revise the 
Electoral Roll Ordinance 2007 to make 
using of voter ID number mandatory in 
obtaining services, such as social safety 
net services, school admission of children, 
marriage registration, passport issuance, 
opening bank account, job application, 
public utilities services etc. 
The success of this policy will depend upon the 
awareness of the people. Continuous awareness-
raising programmes about the roll update can be 
undertaken in partnership with NGOs and local 
government institutions. The BEC can follow a 
target-based approach in enrolment, e.g. rural 
people with the help of union parishads, office-
based enrolment for service holders, university-
based enrolment for students, etc. The Commission 
should take special notice of vulnerable groups like 
slum dwellers, daily labourers, etc. 
Policy Recommendation: The BEC should 
undertake periodic target-based enrolment 
drive and analyze the distribution of 
different target groups in terms of fresh 
enrolment and update for identifying 
vulnerable groups.  
4.4. Regulatory Activities
4.4.1 The BEC has vast regulatory power on 
paper, but it often fails to exercise it. There are 
two probable reasons behind this - the BEC often 
faces difficulty in obtaining concrete evidence 
about electoral offences and second, there exists 
a feeling of insecurity among BEC officials and the 
police in taking actions against pre-poll irregularities 
digital electoral roll requires a rearrangement of the 
manpower structure in the field offices. 
Policy Recommendation: The BEC should 
consider establishing district based 
field offices that commensurate with the 
number of population and restructuring 
the organogram of those offices according 
to their activities. 
This recommendation may be implemented by 
merging existing upazilla offices with those of 
districts. This will enable the BEC to have better 
equipped field offices by concentrating various 
skills-mix within a single zone.
   
4.1.3 The Returning Officer (RO) plays a key role 
in conducting election. Deputy Commissioners 
(DCs) and Upazilla Nirbahi Officers (UNOs)  are 
usually chosen as ROs to the parliamentary and 
union parishad elections rerpectively. As both 
the DCs and the UNOs are government officials, 
the Government can influence election results by 
placing partisan civil servants in these posts. 
Policy Recommendation: The BEC should 
consider District Election Officers (DEOs) 
for parliamentary election and Upazilla 
Election Officers for union and upazilla 
elections as ROs. 
No legislative amendment will be required to 
implement this recommendation. The new 
arrangement should provide the RO with the 
authority to co-opt any government officials under 
his/her supervision during election period, subject 
to the approval of the Commission.   
4.2. Lack of Planning
The BEC does not engage in strategic planning. 
As a result, it quite often takes initiatives in a 
haphazard manner which lack vision and run 
against the Commission’s objective of holding free 
and fair elections. 
Policy Recommendation:  The BEC should 
introduce a strategic plan for 3/5 years 
and develop a yearly action plan based on 
the strategic plan. It should also introduce 
periodic reviews of the strategic and action 
plans. 
Reviews will detect lapses in the progress and 
design corrective measures. The BEC should 
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Policy Recommendation: Upgrade the 
status and service grade of the BEC 
officials to a level that is equivalent to their 
counterparts in local administration.
CoNClusIoN
The predominant confrontational politics has made 
election management quite difficult in Bangladesh. 
The BEC so far played a passive role in the election 
process to avoid such difficulties. This laissez-
faire policy followed by the Commission partly 
encouraged  commercialisation and criminalisation 
of politics. Therefore, a proactive BEC is a 
demand of the time for consolidating democratic 
process in the country. The present regime has 
collaborated with the Commission in introducing 
some entrenched reforms,  particularly in the legal 
framework governing the electoral process, which 
are expected to bring about positive changes in 
election management. However, legal reform 
alone may fail to produce desired results until 
and unless significant changes are brought about 
to the structure, management and the process 
through which the BEC functions and interacts 
with its stakeholders. Therefore, future reform 
efforts should concentrate on designing such 
policies. This policy note has made an attempt 
to propose certain changes, which will assist the 
BEC to become proactive with greater functional 
independence, accountability, efficiency and 
effectiveness.  
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presumably due to the perpetrators usually being 
the mafia/thugs affiliated to the political parties. 
Policy Recommendation: The BEC should 
build an effective partnership with the ACC, 
the NBR and national intelligence agencies 
for generating evidence. It should form 
and head an all-party advisory committee 
on the prevention of pre-poll irregularities 
in the lead-up to elections to neutralise 
threats and publicise legal actions taken in 
response to irregularities.
The BEC should make efforts to gradually build 
informed stakeholders for facilitating its regulatory 
activities.  For example, it can use the all-party 
advisory committee to inform political parties and 
electoral candidates about laws on one hand, and 
compel them to supply all necessary information 
required by the ACC, the NBR or other regulatory 
bodies on the other. 
4.4.2 There is often confusion about which 
agency is responsible for enforcing electoral 
laws. For instance, according to the current 
practice, the Code of Conduct Rules 1996 can 
be enforced by any police officer on his/her 
own motion or on the order of the Returning 
Officers or Presiding Officers. As a result, both 
may refrain from enforcing the law themselves to 
avoid  responsibilities.
Policy Recommendation: Revise the RPO 
1972 to clearly assign a regulatory role for 
different enforcement agencies and clarify 
the mode of their interaction.
The Commission should monitor the performance 
of each of the regulatory agencies according to the 
revised law.
4.5. Distributive Activities
4.5.1 The BEC depends upon the local administration 
for providing its services to citizens, electoral 
candidates and political parties. But the BEC 
officials find it very difficult to obtain cooperation 
from local administrators who are superior to them 
in service grades. For example, the District Election 
Commissioner enjoys the status of a Senior 
Assistant Secretary, but his local counterparts like 
the Deputy Commissioner or Police Superintendent 
enjoy the status of a Deputy Secretary.
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